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ABSTRACT
Recent international tax reforms provide an advantage to nontax subsidies over economically equivalent tax benefits. Under
several international tax standards, multinational enterprises are
generally better off when they receive non-tax subsidies instead of
equivalent tax benefits. As a result, countries now have a stronger
incentive to adopt non-tax subsidies in order to attract the
investment of multinational enterprises. This tax-driven preference
for non-tax subsidies could shape the landscape of international tax
and subsidy competition in the future. This Article contends that
this preference cannot be justified on policy grounds. To treat
equivalent measures similarly, this Article proposes several changes
in the international tax standards, as well as the design of the
OECD’s recent proposal for a global minimum tax.
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INTRODUCTION

Recent international tax reforms try to curb certain forms of
international tax competition.1 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”)’s project on base erosion and
profit shifting (“BEPS”) targets measures and practices that enable
multinational enterprises (“MNEs”) to shift profits to jurisdictions
where they pay little or no tax on that income. 2 Over 135
jurisdictions have committed to implementing the BEPS minimum
standards.3 Since late 2017, the EU has been blacklisting countries
that do not meet certain international and EU tax standards.4 Most
1
There is extensive literature concerning tax competition. See, e.g., Reuven S.
Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1573 (2000); Richard Collier & Giorgia Maffini, Tax Competition, Tax
Co-operation and BEPS, 3 J. TAX ADMIN. 22 (2017); TSILLY DAGAN, INTERNATIONAL TAX
POLICY: BETWEEN COMPETITION AND COOPERATION (2018); David C. Elkins, The Merits
of Tax Competition in a Globalized Economy, 91 IND. L.J. 905 (2016); Lilian V. Faulhaber,
The Trouble with Tax Competition: From Practice to Theory, 71 TAX L. REV. 311 (2018);
Michael Keen & Kai A. Konrad, The Theory of International Tax Competition and
Coordination, in 5 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 257 (Alan J. Auerbach, Raj
Chetty, Martin Feldstein & Emmanuel Saez eds., 2013); Yoram Margalioth, Tax
Competition, Foreign Direct Investments and Growth: Using the Tax System To Promote
Developing Countries, 23 VA. TAX REV. 161 (2003); Jeffrey Owens, The David H.
Tillinghast Lecture Tax Competition: To Welcome or Not?, 65 TAX L. REV. 173 (2012);
Diane Ring, Democracy, Sovereignty and Tax Competition: The Role of Tax Sovereignty
in Shaping Tax Cooperation, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 555 (2009); Julie Roin, Competition and
Evasion: Another Perspective on International Tax Competition, 89 GEO. L.J. 543 (2001);
Wolfgang Schön, International Tax Coordination for a Second-Best World (Part I), 1
WORLD TAX J. 67 (2009).
2 For extensive literature on the BEPS project, see, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
& Haiyan Xu, Evaluating BEPS: A Reconsideration of the Benefits Principle and Proposal
for UN Oversight, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 185 (2016); Rifat Azam, Ruling the World:
Generating International Tax Norms in the Era of Globalization and BEPS, 50 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 517 (2017); Yariv Brauner, Treaties in the Aftermath of BEPS, 41 BROOK. J. INT’L
L. 973 (2016); Irene Burgers & Irma Mosquera, Corporate Taxation and BEPS: A Fair
Slice for Developing Countries?, 10 ERASMUS L. REV. 29 (2017); Allison Christians,
BEPS and the New International Tax Order, 2016 BYU L. REV. 1603 (2016); Arthur J.
Cockfield, Shaping International Tax Law and Policy in Challenging Times, 54 STAN. J.
INT’L L. 223 (2018); Mindy Herzfeld, The Case Against BEPS: Lessons for Tax
Coordination, 21 FLA. TAX REV. 1 (2017); WU INST. FOR AUSTRIAN AND INT’L TAX L.,
IMPLEMENTING KEY BEPS ACTIONS: WHERE DO WE STAND? (Michael Lang et al. eds.,
2019); Ruth Mason, The Transformation of International Tax, 114 AM. J. INT’L L. 353
(2020).
3 See OECD, OECD/G20 INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS: PROGRESS REPORT
JULY 2019 – JULY 2020, at 2-3 (2020), https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/oecd-g20inclusive-framework-on-beps-progress-report-july-2019-july-2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4V9M-MSAW].
4 See discussion infra Section IV.b.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

448

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 42:2

recently, the OECD has been developing a proposal for a global
minimum tax.5
These reforms provide an advantage to non-tax subsidies over
economically equivalent tax benefits. This Article analyzes the tax
policy implications of this preference for non-tax subsidies. This is
an important fiscal policy matter for many countries, as many
jurisdictions compete over MNE investment by granting tax and
non-tax incentives.6
Part III of this Article shows how three BEPS standards lead to
the result that MNEs are generally better off when they receive nontax subsidies rather than the equivalent tax benefits. First, a countryby-country (“CbC”) report would show higher taxes paid and
accrued where the MNE pays tax on its income and receives a
subsidy equal to the tax.7 The CbC report would show lower taxes
paid and accrued where the MNE receives a tax benefit and
generates income subject to no or low tax. Consequently, where the
MNE receives a non-tax subsidy, its risk of being targeted by other
countries’ tax authorities for profit shifting would be lower. Second,
countries that implement BEPS must exchange certain tax rulings,
whereas the exchange of information regarding equivalent non-tax
subsidies is not required.8 Third, under the BEPS recommendations
for controlled foreign corporation (“CFC”) rules, a CFC that receives
a non-tax subsidy and pays tax is more likely to be exempted from
the CFC rules because it is subject to a higher effective tax rate.9 A
parent company of a CFC that receives a non-tax subsidy and pays
tax on its income should be able to claim a tax credit for the amount
of tax the CFC has paid, whereas no tax credit can be claimed if the
CFC receives a tax benefit and does not pay tax.10
5 See OECD, GLOBAL ANTI-BASE EROSION PROPOSAL (“GLOBE”) - PILLAR TWO,
¶¶ 34-39 (2019), https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/public-consultation-documentglobal-anti-base-erosion-proposal-pillar-two.pdf.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7RHSB6V7].
6 See discussion infra Part II.
7 See discussion infra Section III.a.
8 See discussion infra Section III.b. These two standards—CbC reporting and
spontaneous exchange of tax rulings—are part of the minimum standards under
BEPS. OECD, supra note 3, at 14-17. All members of the Inclusive Framework must
implement these standards. See OECD, INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS: PROGRESS
REPORT
JULY
2016
JUNE
2017,
at
7
(2017),
https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/inclusive-framework-on-BEPS-progress-reportjuly-2016-june-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8UA-K69R].
9 See discussion infra Section III.c.
10 See discussion infra Section III.c.
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The OECD’s recent proposal for a global minimum tax—titled
by the OECD as the Global Anti-Base Erosion (“GloBE”) proposal—
has the potential to further increase the advantage of non-tax
subsidies over equivalent tax benefits.11 Similar to CFC rules, the
proposed rules under the GloBE regime would generally impose
lower taxes where a subsidiary receives a non-tax subsidy and pays
tax on its income instead of receiving an equivalent tax benefit and
paying no or low tax. The carve-outs in the OECD proposal, which
are limited to a modest return on expenditures on payroll and
tangible assets, might not fully exclude income benefitting from
non-harmful tax incentive regimes. Therefore, the proposed GloBE
regime would further reduce the benefit of non-harmful tax
subsidies and increase the preference for equivalent non-tax
subsidies.
Countries now have stronger incentives to adopt non-tax
subsidies over tax benefits to attract MNE investment, as discussed
in Part IV. As MNEs generally prefer non-tax subsidies over tax
benefits, countries can attract more MNE investment at the same
economic cost by granting non-tax subsidies instead of equivalent
tax benefits. In addition, countries are now scrutinized by the OECD
and the EU for their preferential tax regimes. A country that
provides tax benefits is at risk of being accused of engaging in
harmful tax competition by the OECD,12 or of being blacklisted as a
“non-cooperative tax jurisdiction” by the EU.13 For example, South
Korea was blacklisted by the EU in late 2017 for granting tax benefits
to foreign investors.14 These risks can be reduced by offering nontax subsidies instead of tax benefits. The incentive for countries to
move from international tax competition to international subsidy
competition could shape the way countries compete for MNE
investment in the future.
What are the implications of this tax-driven preference for nontax subsidies? This Article argues that the preference for non-tax
subsidies over equivalent tax subsidies might result in welfare
losses. Treating equivalent non-harmful tax subsidies and non-tax
11
OECD, PROGRAMME OF WORK TO DEVELOP A CONSENSUS SOLUTION TO THE TAX
CHALLENGES ARISING FROM THE DIGITALISATION OF THE ECONOMY 26-29 (2019),
https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/programme-of-work-to-develop-a-consensus-s
olution-to-the-tax-challenges-arising-from-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LC2E-GEUG]; see also discussion infra Section III.d.
12 See discussion infra Section IV.a.
13 See discussion infra Section IV.b.
14
Id.
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subsidies differently could result in suboptimal governmental
policies. Following David Weisbach and Jacob Nussim, the choice
between an equivalent tax expenditure and a spending program
should depend on which agency would optimally administer the
scheme. 15 The tax-driven preference for non-tax subsidies might
result in deadweight losses where the optimal instrument is a tax
incentive scheme. In addition, welfare losses may occur where nonharmful tax benefits which increase welfare cannot be replaced with
equivalent non-tax subsidies, or where they can be replaced but at a
high cost. There is an additional risk that some countries might
replace certain harmful tax subsidies with equivalent harmful nontax subsidies. This could be the case where a country grants a
subsidy designed to offset the recipients’ tax liability with no
substance requirement. In addition, while the EU has blacklisted
countries for granting “ring-fenced” tax benefits to foreign investors
only, 16 countries might adopt equivalent ring-fenced non-tax
subsidies.
Therefore, this Article argues that international tax standards
should not create a preference for non-tax subsidies over equivalent
tax benefits. In addition to the efficiency considerations, this
approach would be consistent with the principle of horizontal
equity and would improve transparency. This approach is
comparable to the WTO subsidy rules and the EU state aid rules that
generally treat equivalent tax and non-tax subsidies similarly. Part
V elaborates on these considerations and proposes several changes
in the current international tax standards and the design of the
proposed global minimum tax.
The Article is organized as follows: Part II provides background
on subsidies and tax benefits. Part III shows how MNEs are better
off when they receive non-tax subsidies instead of equivalent tax
benefits. Part IV discusses countries’ incentives to adopt non-tax
subsidies instead of tax incentives. Part V considers the tax policy
implications and proposes several changes in the international tax
standards. Part VI provides a conclusion.

15 See David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending
Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 980 (2004).
16
See discussion infra Section IV.b.
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II. BACKGROUND ON SUBSIDIES AND TAX BENEFITS
Governments can provide subsidies17 through cash grants, tax
benefits, 18 and other ways, such as allocating rights or providing
goods or services at a rate below their market value. Where a
subsidy is structured as a tax benefit, it is, in substance, a spending
program administered through the tax system.19
It is generally possible to design a non-tax subsidy program
(such as a cash grant scheme) so it would be economically equivalent
to a tax incentive program, and vice versa.20 For example, assume
17
There is no general definition for the term “subsidy.” For an in-depth
discussion about the definition of “subsidy,” see LUCA RUBINI, THE DEFINITION OF
SUBSIDY AND STATE AID: WTO AND EC LAW IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE passim
(2009). Under the WTO definition, a subsidy exists where a government or a public
body confer a benefit through a financial contribution or price support. “Financial
contribution” is defined broadly, and it includes fiscal incentives and tax benefits.
See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art 1.1, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869
U.N.T.S 14 [hereinafter WTO Subsidies Agreement]; see also discussion infra Part V.
18
Tax benefits are generally benefits administered by the tax authority that
impact the taxpayers’ tax liability.
19 For an example of the extensive literature on tax expenditures, see Stanley
S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison
with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970) and the subsequent
literature. See also STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 115TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL
TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2016-2020, JCX-3-17, at 2 (2017) (“Special
income tax provisions are referred to as tax expenditures because they may be
analogous to direct outlay programs and may be considered alternative means of
accomplishing similar budget policy objectives. Tax expenditures are similar to
direct spending programs that function as entitlements to those who meet the
established statutory criteria.”).
20 See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 15, at 961 (“As Stanley Surrey noted in
his tax expenditures analysis, virtually any program can be implemented in at least
two ways. It can be implemented through a direct spending program or through a
tax program.”); Jacob Nussim & Anat Sorek, Theorizing Tax Incentives for Innovation,
36 VA. TAX REV. 25, 58 (2017) (“Tax incentives and cash transfers are not the same
thing, but tax incentives can be designed similarly to cash transfers, and vice versa.
This is a straightforward insight, which originated the tax expenditures idea.”); see
also id. at 60 (“Any tax subsidy can be designed as an equivalent grant, and vice
versa. Both provide cash to innovation processes; both can be similarly contingent
on certain market variables, or not; both can allocate innovation risk in the same
way; both may require the same amount of information for design and
implementation.”). This assumes that there are no political, institutional, and
implementation constraints. Following Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 15, as no
normative choice can be made between equivalent instruments, the choice of
whether the subsidy should be granted as a tax benefit or as a cash grant largely
depends on which government agency would optimally administer the scheme.
For further articles implementing the approach proposed in Weisbach & Nussim,
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that an MNE currently has an annual taxable income of $2,000 in
Country X. This income is currently taxed at 20%—$400 in tax paid
per year. The MNE considers opening a new research and
development (R&D) center in Country X, but it will open it only if
the government grants a tax benefit or a subsidy worth $400 per
year. The benefits for Country X from the R&D center are expected
to be greater than $400 per year. The government of Country X is
indifferent about the design of the subsidy, which may be structured
as one of the following incentives:
(a) A tax benefit that exempts the income of $2,000 from tax,
thereby saving the annual tax liability of $400.
(b) Investment tax credits that offset the tax liability, thereby
saving the annual tax liability of $400.
(c) An annual government grant of $500 that is subject to a
tax of 20% so that the net benefit is $400.
(d) An annual government grant of $400 that is not subject
to tax.
These options have a similar effect: The government grants the
MNE a benefit of $400.
Designing equivalent non-tax subsidies and tax benefits might
be simpler in some cases and more complicated in others. Tax
benefits based on the taxpayer’s expenditure (e.g., R&D investment)
can be replaced with cash subsidies based on the same expenditure.
For example, a refundable investment credit is equivalent to a cash
subsidy with a matching requirement.21 A non-refundable tax credit
or a super deduction is equivalent to a subsidy that requires
matching and is subject to a cap set at the recipient’s tax liability.22
However, where there is a direct link between the subsidy and the
tax liability, there is a higher risk that other countries might treat the
non-tax subsidy as a tax benefit in disguise. Less direct ways to
design an equivalent non-tax subsidy would require estimating the
expected tax liability and setting the cap accordingly.
Tax benefits that exempt income can be replaced with a non-tax
subsidy based on an estimate of the expected tax liability without
supra note 15, see Noam Noked, Integrated Tax Policy Approach to Designing Research
& Development Tax Benefits, 34 VA. TAX REV. 109, 143 (2014); Noam Noked, Designing
R&D Incentives in Hong Kong, 14 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 41 (2019).
21 See Noked, Designing R&D Incentives in Hong Kong, supra note 20, at 60.
22 See id.
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the exemption,23 or a subsidy subject to a cap set at the taxpayer’s
tax liability.24 There may be cases where certain tax benefits cannot
be substituted with non-tax subsidies that are entirely equivalent.
Nonetheless, as MNEs and governments are repeat players, they can
agree on mechanisms that achieve this equivalency over time, even
if the substitution is imperfect.25 Substituting tax benefits with nontax subsidies and vice versa might not be possible; there may be
political, legal and implementation constraints that limit the ability
to replace some instruments with equivalent instruments.26
III. MNES’ PREFERENCE FOR NON-TAX SUBSIDIES
This Part analyzes three BEPS standards that contribute to the
advantage MNEs have when they receive non-tax subsidies instead
of equivalent tax benefits: CbC reporting (Action 13), spontaneous
exchange of tax rulings (Action 5), and the OECD recommendations
for CFC rules (Action 3).27 After discussing these BEPS standards,
this Part also considers the potential impact of the OECD’s recent
proposal for a global minimum tax on the preference for non-tax
subsidies.
a. Country-by-Country Reports
Many countries have started exchanging CbC reports since 2018.
Tax authorities are expected to use these reports to identify where
23
Estimating the expected tax liability may be easier in some cases and harder
in others. It would be easier to reliably estimate the tax liability where the MNE’s
income is stable, predictable, or where it depends on certain observable factors that
can be used for the calculation of the subsidy (for example, where the income is
calculated on a cost-plus basis, the subsidy can be calculated as a proportion of the
relevant expenditure, similar to the calculation of the tax under the cost-plus
method).
24
As noted above, where there is a direct link between the subsidy to the
recipient’s tax liability, there is a higher risk that other countries might treat the
subsidy as a tax subsidy in disguise.
25
For example, a multi-year subsidy may be updated annually to correct for
previous years’ overpayment or underpayment.
26 See Nussim & Sorek, supra note 20, at 58.
27
In addition to these BEPS standards, it is possible that other BEPS standards
that increase the pressure on tax competition also contribute to MNEs’ preference
for subsidies.
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MNEs may have been engaged in profit shifting to low-or-no tax
jurisdictions.28 If, as a result of a tax benefit, an MNE pays no or low
tax on its income in a particular jurisdiction, then there is a risk that
other countries would tax that income. This risk would be lower if
the MNE pays tax on its income and receives a non-tax subsidy
equal to the value of the equivalent tax benefit.
When comparing the impact of various equivalent tax benefits
and non-tax subsidies on the CbC report, the optimal incentive
instrument is a non-tax subsidy subject to tax. This non-tax subsidy
results in the highest tax liability and effective tax rate. The secondbest option is a non-tax subsidy exempted from tax. Providing tax
benefits—either through investment tax credits or a tax exemption—
results in an even lower effective tax rate and income tax liability in
the relevant jurisdiction. This is why tax benefits worsen the MNE’s
position in other jurisdictions that may impose tax on the untaxed
or lightly taxed MNE income in the jurisdiction that grants the tax
benefits.
Section III.a.i. provides a high-level summary of the CbC
reporting requirements. 29 Section III.a.ii. discusses how various
equivalent subsidies and tax benefits should be reflected in the CbC
report. This is demonstrated in the example in Section III.a.iii.
i.

General Requirements

Under BEPS Action 13,
large MNEs are required to file a Country-by-Country
Report that will provide annually and for each tax
jurisdiction in which they do business the amount of
28
For a discussion on the potential implications of the CbC reporting, see, e.g.,
Michelle Hanlon, Country-by-Country Reporting and the International Allocation of
Taxing Rights, 72 BULL. FOR INT’L TAX’N 209 (2018). According to Hanlon, as a result
of CbC reporting, MNEs will engage in less income shifting or move real economic
activities to jurisdictions where they want to report income; CbC reporting will
provide tax authorities with more data than what is currently available;
governments will likely use this information to claim more taxing rights to MNEs’
income; where countries claim more taxing rights, there is a risk of more conflicts
between countries; and it is possible that CbC reporting might lead to abandoning
the arm’s length principle in favor of formulary apportionment or certain forms of
source or destination-based taxation. Id. at 216.
29
For further discussion on CbC reporting, see Noam Noked, Special Report,
Public Country-by-Country Reporting: The Shareholders’ Case for Mandatory Disclosure,
90 TAX NOTES INT’L 1501, 1502-03 (2018).
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revenue, profit before income tax and income tax paid and
accrued. It also requires MNEs to report their number of
employees, stated capital, retained earnings and tangible
assets in each tax jurisdiction.30
MNEs with annual consolidated group revenues of at least 750
million euros must file CbC reports.31
The MNE should file the CbC report in the jurisdiction where
the MNE’s ultimate parent entity is resident, and that jurisdiction
should exchange the information with the jurisdictions in which the
MNE group operates if these jurisdictions meet certain conditions of
confidentiality, consistency and appropriate use. 32 Where the
ultimate parent entity’s jurisdiction of residence does not exchange
the CbC reports with other jurisdictions which satisfy the relevant
conditions, other jurisdictions can require a local entity from the
MNE group to file the CbC report for the whole group.33 In general,
the first reported year was 2016, and the reporting started in 2018.34
The CbC report requires the reporting of the following
information for each of the jurisdictions where the MNE does
business: revenues divided into revenues from related and

30 See OECD, TRANSFER PRICING DOCUMENTATION AND COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY
REPORTING, ACTION 13: 2015 FINAL REPORT 9 (2015) [hereinafter ACTION 13],
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264241480-en.pdf?expires=160796
8695&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=ED816ADE849164B482AB47A4E680DF
DE [https://perma.cc/W3Q9-B58J].
31 Id. at 10.
32 Id. ¶¶ 56-59.
33 Id.
34 See id. ¶ 50. While some countries followed this timeline, other countries
have adopted or will adopt a more delayed implementation timeline. For example,
in Hong Kong, the first year to be reported is 2018. Hong Kong MNEs may
voluntarily file CbC reports for 2016 or 2017. The first exchange will take place later
than 2018. See OECD, COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORTING – COMPILATION OF PEER
REVIEW REPORTS (PHASE 2): INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS: ACTION 13, at 231-36
(2019),
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/f9bf1157en.pdf?expires=1607968820&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=EE9E9A87779C9
61DED2DF27F09B07704 [https://perma.cc/XDY7-H49S].
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unrelated parties,35 profit (loss) before income tax,36 income tax paid
(on cash basis), 37 income tax accrued in the current year, stated
capital, accumulated earnings, number of employees, and tangible
assets other than cash and cash equivalents.38
Income tax cash payments are generally less susceptible to
accounting manipulation, so it is possible that tax authorities will
pay close attention to the income tax paid and to the ratio of the
income tax paid to the before-tax profits or the revenues. The
discussion below shows that the choice between equivalent
instruments has substantial implications on the income tax liability
and these ratios.
Action 13 does not instruct which accounting principles should
be used by MNEs when preparing the CbC reports. Action 13 noted
that each MNE “may choose to use data from its consolidation
reporting packages, from separate entity statutory financial
statements, regulatory financial statements, or internal management
accounts.”39 The discussion below assumes that the MNE uses the
financial statements as the source of data for the CbC report, and
that the relevant accounting standards generally follow the
International Accounting Standards (“IAS”).

35

In the “Revenues” column, the MNE should report the following:

(i) the sum of revenues of all the Constituent Entities of the MNE group in
the relevant tax jurisdiction generated from transactions with associated
enterprises; (ii) the sum of revenues of all the Constituent Entities of the
MNE group in the relevant tax jurisdiction generated from transactions
with independent parties; and (iii) the total of (i) and (ii). Revenues should
include revenues from sales of inventory and properties, services,
royalties, interest, premiums and any other amounts.
ACTION 13, supra note 31, at 33.
36
In the “Profit (Loss) before Income Tax” column, the MNE should report
“the sum of the profit (loss) before income tax for all the Constituent Entities
resident for tax purposes in the relevant tax jurisdiction. The profit (loss) before
income tax should include all extraordinary income and expense items.” Id.
37
In the “Income Tax Paid (on Cash Basis)” column the MNE should report
“the total amount of income tax actually paid during the relevant fiscal year by all
the Constituent Entities resident for tax purposes in the relevant tax jurisdiction.”
Id.
38 Id. at 29.
39 Id. at 32.
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How Subsidies and Tax Benefits Affect the CbC Reports

How will subsidies to MNEs be reflected in CbC reports? IAS
20 provides guidance on the accounting of government grants and
other forms of government assistance. 40 In general, an entity can
recognize a government grant when there is reasonable assurance
that the entity will comply with the conditions attached to the
grant,41 and that the grant will be received.42 The income should be
recognized over the period in which the related costs are incurred.43
Grants should be presented in the income statement either
separately or as “other income.” 44 Alternatively, it is possible to
deduct the grants from the related expenses.45 IAS 20 does not apply
to government assistance in the form of tax incentives. 46 When
grants are recognized as income or as a reduction of an expense, this
should increase the “Profit (Loss) before Income Tax” column in the
CbC report. Under Action 13 and the applicable OECD guidance, it
appears that grants recognized as income should be included in the
“Revenues” column in the CbC report.47 It is unclear whether grants
40
INT’L. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARD 20,
ACCOUNTING FOR GOVERNMENT GRANTS AND THE DISCLOSURE OF GOVERNMENT
ASSISTANCE (1983) [hereinafter IAS 20].
41
“Government grants” are defined broadly as

assistance by government in the form of transfers of resources to an entity
in return for past or future compliance with certain conditions relating to
the operating activities of the entity. They exclude those forms of
government assistance which cannot reasonably have a value placed upon
them and transactions with government which cannot be distinguished
from the normal trading transactions of the entity.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id. ¶ 7.
Id. ¶ 12.
44 Id. ¶ 29.
45 See id.
46
Id. ¶ 2(b) (limiting the scope of IAS to not include “government assistance
that is provided for an entity in the form of benefits that are available in determining
taxable profit or tax loss, or are determined or limited on the basis of income tax
liability. Examples of such benefits are income tax holidays, investment tax credits,
accelerated depreciation allowances and reduced income tax rates”).
47
ACTION 13, supra note 30, at 33. The OECD guidance also provides that “[a]ll
revenue, gains, income, or other inflows shown in the financial statement prepared
in accordance with the applicable accounting rules relating to profit and loss, such
as the income statement or profit and loss statement, should be reported as
Revenues in Table 1.” OECD, GUIDANCE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COUNTRY-BYCOUNTRY REPORTING, BEPS ACTION 13, at 7 (2019) [hereinafter OECD GUIDANCE],
42
43
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should be included in the “Revenues” column where the grants are
treated as a reduction of the relevant expense. The impact of the
grant on the “Income Tax Paid (On Cash Basis)”48 column depends
on whether the grant is exempted from income tax.49 If the grant is
subject to tax, then this additional tax will increase the entity’s tax
liability. If the grant is exempted from taxation, then it will not
increase the tax liability.
Tax benefits that are not investment tax credits (e.g., a tax
exemption) should be disclosed separately,50 and not as part of the
entity’s revenues or income before tax. Thus, if a tax benefit (other
than investment tax credit) is received, it will not increase the CbC
report’s revenues and profit (loss) before income tax. A tax benefit
would reduce the “Income tax paid” column because the tax paid
would be lower if a tax benefit is received.
Investment tax credits are excluded from both IAS 20 and IAS
12, and the International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”) do
not provide guidance on how they should be reflected in the

https://www.oecd.org/ctp/guidance-on-the-implementation-of-country-by-coun
try-reporting-beps-action-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZ2G-M2TT]. According to
the OECD guidance, the “Revenues” also include income items such as “other
income” that may not be included in the revenue line of the income statement. Id.
(“For example, if the income statement prepared in accordance with the applicable
accounting rules shows sales revenue, net capital gains from sales of assets,
unrealized gains, interest received, and extraordinary income, the amount of those
items reported in the income statement should be aggregated and reported as
Revenues in Table 1.”).
48
This column is referred to as “Income Tax Paid” in the discussion below.
49
The taxation of grants depends on the terms of each particular grant and
the domestic tax law in the relevant jurisdiction. For example, Canada, Australia,
and Singapore apply different tax rules to different grants. See TOVA EPP,
GOVERNMENT
GRANTS
AND
THEIR
TAX
TREATMENTS
(2018),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5565ecede4b0df78d78d2b36/t/5bc6926de
2c483c657da646f/1539740274622/GovernmentGrantsWhitepaper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X27T-FVEH] (for Canada); CPA AUSTRALIA, GRANTS IN
AUSTRALIA
(2012),
https://www.cpaaustralia.com.au/~/media/corporate/allfiles/document/profe
ssional-resources/notforprofit/grants-in-australia.pdf [https://perma.cc/366GUL3T] (for Australia); Tax Treatment of Grants/Payouts Commonly Received by
Companies,
INLAND
REVENUE
AUTH.
SING.
(May
2020),
https://www.iras.gov.sg/irashome/Businesses/Companies/Working-out-Corpo
rate-Income-Taxes/Taxable-and-Non-Taxable-Income/Tax-Treatment-of-Grants/
-Payouts-Commonly-Received-by-Companies/ [https://perma.cc/WB4E-8J4K]
(for Singapore).
50
INT’L. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARD 12, at
§ 79 (1996) [hereinafter IAS 12].
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financial statements.51 The accounting treatment of investment tax
credits depends on the applicable domestic legislation, group policy,
and other factors, such as whether the investment tax credits are
refundable (i.e., can be settled with cash).52 For example, in 2013 the
United Kingdom introduced the Research and Development
Expenditure Credit (also known as the “above the line” credit),
which provides a tax credit for qualifying R&D expenditure.53 This
credit is similar to a subsidy because it is payable in cash, net of tax,
to companies with no tax liability.54 The accounting treatment of
this credit would likely be similar to the treatment of a government
grant. Other investment tax credits may be reported similarly to
other tax benefits, resulting in no impact on the “Revenues” and
“Profit (Loss) before Income Tax” columns. If the entity that receives
the credit has taxable income before applying the credit, receiving
this credit should reduce the “Income Tax Paid (on Cash Basis)”
column.
Table 1 summarizes how government grants, investment tax
credits, and tax benefits other than investment tax credits should be
reflected in the following columns of the CbC report: “Revenues,”
“Profit (Loss) before Income Tax,” and “Income Tax Paid.”

51
See Silvia, Tax Incentives - IAS 12 or IAS 20?, CPD BOX (2015),
https://www.cpdbox.com/tax-incentives-accounting-ifrs/
[https://perma.cc/BC2G-5J4T]; Valerie Boissou, KPMG, Government Grants: IFRS
Compared
to
US
GAAP
(May
31,
2019),
https://advisory.kpmg.us/articles/2019/government-grants-ifrs-compared-to-us
-gaap.html [https://perma.cc/G8FS-WBGE].
52 See id.
53
Kathie Haunton & Sarah Goodman, Taking the Credit, TAXADVISER (Aug. 1,
2015),
https://www.taxadvisermagazine.com/article/taking-credit
[https://perma.cc/A2AN-VGMZ]; see Research and Development (R&D) Expenditure
Credit, GOV.UK (Jan. 1, 2007), https://www.gov.uk/guidance/corporation-taxresearch-and-development-tax-relief-for-large-companies
[https://perma.cc/TJU7-YUF8].
54
For additional guidance, see Haunton & Goodman, supra note 54.
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Table 1
CbC Report
Item

Government Grants

Tax Benefits Other
Than Investment
Tax Credits

Investment Tax
Credits

Revenues
and Profit
(Loss) Before
Income Tax

Government grants
increase the
“Revenues” and the
“Profit (loss) before
tax” columns.

Tax benefits
generally do not
affect the
“Revenues” and the
“Profit (loss) before
tax” columns.

Depending on the
terms of the credits
and the accounting
policy, investment tax
credits may or may
not affect the
“Revenues” and the
“Profit (loss) before
tax” columns.

Income Tax
Paid (on
Cash Basis)

Depending on the
specific terms, a
government grant
may or may not be
subject to corporate
income tax.

Tax benefits
generally reduce the
“Income tax paid”
column.

Investment tax credits
generally reduce the
“Income tax paid”
column.

iii. Example
This example demonstrates the impact of equivalent non-tax
subsidies and tax benefits on the CbC report. In this example, an
MNE currently has annual revenues of $2,500 and an annual profit
before tax of $2,000 in Country X. This profit is currently taxed at
20%—$400 in tax paid per year. Assume that an MNE is considering
opening a new R&D center in Country X. It will open the R&D
center in Country X only if the government grants a tax benefit or a
non-tax subsidy worth $400 per year. The benefits for Country X
from the R&D center are expected to be greater than $400 per year.
The government of Country X is indifferent about the design of the
subsidy, which may be structured as one of the following incentives:
(a) Tax benefits (which are not investment tax credits) that
exempt the income before tax of $2,000, thereby eliminating
the annual tax liability of $400.
(b) Investment tax credits that offset the tax liability, thereby
eliminating the annual tax liability of $400.
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(c) An annual government grant of 500 that is subject to tax
of 20%, so that the net benefit is $400.
(d) An annual government grant of $400 that is not subject
to tax.
Table 2 summarizes how each incentive will be reflected in the
MNE’s CbC report. Units are United States Dollars unless otherwise
indicated.
Table 2
Item in
the CbC
report

Before the
incentive

(a) Tax
exemption

(b) Investment
tax credits

(c) Grant
subject to
tax

(d) Grant
not
subject
to tax

Revenues

2,500

2,500

2,500 or 2,900

3,000

2,900

Profit
(loss)
before
income
tax

2,000

2,000

2,000 or 2,400

2,500

2,400

Income
tax paid

400

0

0

500

400

Net
benefit

0

400

400

400

400

Ratio of
income
tax paid
to
revenues

16.66%

0%

0%

16.66%

13.79%

Ratio of
income
tax paid
to profit
before
income
tax

20%

0%

0%

20%

16.66%

Under option (a), the tax exemption does not increase the
“Revenues” and the “Profit (Loss) Before Tax” columns, and they
remain unchanged ($2,500 and $2,000, respectively). The tax
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exemption reduces the tax liability to zero, resulting in an effective
tax rate of zero—much lower than the effective tax rate of 20% before
granting the subsidy.
Under option (b), some investment tax credits may not affect the
“Revenues” and “Profit (Loss) Before Tax” columns, while other
investment tax credits (e.g., “above the line” credits) may increase
them. The exact accounting treatment depends on the terms of the
credits and the accounting policy. Similar to option (a), the
investment tax credits reduce the tax liability to zero, and the
effective tax rate is zero.
Under option (c), we assume that the government grant of $500
is subject to corporate income tax. As the government grant should
generally be included in the “Revenues” 55 and the “Profit (Loss)
Before Tax” columns, they increase to $3,000 and $2,500,
respectively. The “Income Tax Paid” column increases from $400 to
$500 because of the additional tax on the government grant. The
effective tax rate, calculated as the ratio of the income tax paid to
profit (loss) before tax, is 20%, similar to the effective tax rate before
granting the non-tax subsidy.
Under option (d), we assume that the government grant of $400
is exempted from corporate income tax. The grant should be
included in the “Revenues” and the “Profit (Loss) Before Tax”
columns, so that they increase to $2,900 and $2,400, respectively. As
the tax liability remains the same, the “Income Tax Paid” column
remains $400. The effective tax rate is 16.66%, lower than the
effective tax rate before granting the non-tax subsidy, but
substantially higher than zero as in options (a) and (b).
Although all four alternatives provide subsidies with the same
economic value ($400), they vary in their impact on the MNE’s CbC
report. Consequently, the resulting risks for the MNE differ
substantially. From a CbC reporting perspective, the optimal
subsidy would follow alternative (c)—a government grant subject to
tax—because this subsidy shows the highest tax liability and the
highest effective tax rate. The second-best option follows alternative
(d) as it results in lower tax liability and effective tax rate. Options
(a) and (b)—providing tax benefits—put the MNE in the worst
position because tax authorities in other jurisdictions might try to
55
As noted in Section III.a.ii., supra, it is unclear if a government grant should
be reflected in the “Revenues” column if the MNE records the grant as a reduction
of a relevant expense and not as income, although in principle this appears to be
the correct approach. This example assumes that the grant has been recorded as
income, and thus it should be included in the “Revenues” column in the CbC report.
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tax the untaxed income in Country X, claiming that the MNE shifted
profits to that jurisdiction in order to avoid taxation in other
jurisdictions.
This example demonstrates another important point about the
effect of CbC reporting. Although the OECD has stated that BEPS
measures should target only instances where MNEs “artificially
shift profits to low or no-tax locations where there is little or no
economic activity,” 56 they, in fact, discourage all tax benefits,
including tax benefits for substantial economic activities. For
example, if a MNE does not pay tax on its profits in Hong Kong or
Singapore because it receives tax benefits for investing in R&D
activities in those jurisdictions, the CbC report will reveal no income
tax paid or accrued, thereby exposing the MNE to a higher risk of
other countries’ tax authorities arguing that the MNE shifted profits
to those jurisdictions to avoid taxation.
Where an MNE pays low taxes as a result of receiving nonharmful tax benefits for the income generated in the relevant
jurisdiction that provided the tax benefits, the MNE should be able
to explain that to other countries’ tax authorities, and they should
not tax that income. However, in reality, the reporting of untaxed
or lightly taxed income puts the MNE at risk because of the
increased risk for audits and disputes, the risk that other countries’
tax authorities might reject the MNE’s explanations, and the risk that
some tax authorities might misuse the CbC reporting.57
b. Spontaneous Exchange of Tax Rulings
BEPS Action 5 states that countries which joined the BEPS
Inclusive Framework must spontaneously exchange certain tax
rulings with certain jurisdictions.58 The term “ruling” means “any
56
What
is
BEPS?:
What
is
the
Issue?,
OECD
(2019),
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-about.htm
[https://perma.cc/838R-6WFM].
Similar language appears in the BEPS action plan and final reports. See OECD,
OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT: EXPLANATORY STATEMENT:
2015 FINAL REPORT 14 (2015), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-explanatorystatement-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/22EJ-QHER].
57 See, e.g., William Hoke, Multinationals Concerned about Misuse of CbC Reports,
85 TAX NOTES INT’L 409 (2017).
58
OECD, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT:
COUNTERING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES MORE EFFECTIVELY, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT
TRANSPARENCY AND SUBSTANCE: ACTION 5: 2015 FINAL REPORT 45-46 (2015),
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advice, information or undertaking provided by a tax authority to a
specific taxpayer or group of taxpayers concerning their tax
situation and on which they are entitled to rely.” 59 Rulings
concerning preferential tax regimes must be exchanged.
Rulings concerning non-tax subsidies are outside the scope of
this definition. Tax authorities typically do not provide any advice,
information, or undertaking about non-tax subsidies. In addition,
non-tax subsidies do not directly affect a taxpayer’s “tax situation.”
Action 5 neither discusses nor mentions subsidies, government
grants, or other non-tax government incentives. Thus, non-tax
subsidies are generally not subject to compulsory spontaneous
exchange which applies to tax rulings under BEPS.
Before the compulsory spontaneous exchange under Action 5,
other countries affected by tax rulings may not have been aware of
them. Now, when other countries know about the rulings, there is
a higher likelihood that those other countries will audit the MNEs
that receive the tax benefits under these tax rulings and impose
higher taxes if the rulings are used for profit shifting.
To avoid the reporting of the incentives granted under a
reportable tax ruling, governments may provide equivalent non-tax

https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264241190-en.pdf?expires=160796
9397&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=67EC66CBF667728AEE243D3E71EF3233
[https://perma.cc/4AJF-AGYT]. The jurisdictions that receive the rulings are
generally the jurisdictions
of residence of all related parties with which the taxpayer enters into a
transaction for which a ruling is granted or which gives rise to income
from related parties benefiting from a preferential treatment . . . and the
residence [jurisdiction] of the ultimate parent company and the immediate
parent company.
Id. ¶ 121.
59
Id. ¶ 95 (footnote omitted). Action 5 provides a list of six categories of
taxpayer-specific rulings to which the compulsory spontaneous exchange applies:
(i) rulings relating to preferential regimes; (ii) unilateral APAs [advance
pricing agreements] or other cross-border unilateral rulings in respect of
transfer pricing; (iii) cross-border rulings providing for a downward
adjustment of taxable profits; (iv) permanent establishment (PE) rulings;
(v) related party conduit rulings; and (vi) any other type of ruling agreed
by the FHTP [Forum on Harmful Tax Practices] that in the absence of
spontaneous information exchange gives rise to BEPS concerns.
Id. ¶ 91.
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subsidies. Such non-tax subsidies may be kept confidential if the
disclosure is not required under other laws.60
c. CFC Rules
BEPS Action 3 provides recommendations for the design of CFC
rules. Although these recommendations are considered as nonbinding “soft law,” the OECD notes that “there is an expectation that
they will be implemented accordingly by countries that are part of
the consensus.”61
One of the OECD recommendations is “to include a tax rate
exemption that would allow companies that are subject to an
effective tax rate that is sufficiently similar to the tax rate applied in
the parent jurisdiction not to be subject to CFC taxation.”62 The tax
rate exemption requires that the rate at which the CFC was taxed be
below a certain threshold, which could be a particular fixed rate
(e.g., ten percent) or a percentage of the parent country’s own rate
on a similar income.63 Once the threshold has been determined, the
tax rate in the CFC jurisdiction should be compared to the threshold.
Action 3 recommends using the effective rate of the CFC itself and
not the nominal or statutory tax rate in the jurisdiction of the CFC.64
The calculation of the effective tax rate is based on the ratio of the
actual tax paid in the CFC jurisdiction to the total taxable income.65
60
Disclosure of certain subsidies may be required under the WTO subsidy
rules and the EU state aid rules. See Commission Regulation 651/2014, 2014 O.J. (L
187) 1 (EU); Commission Regulation 1388/2014, 2014 O.J. (L 369) 37 (EU);
Commission Regulation 702/2014, 2014 O.J. (L 193) 1 (EU); WORLD TRADE ORG.,
WORLD
TRADE
REPORT
2006,
at
194
(2006),
https://www.wto.org/English/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report06
_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6VX-B2BX]. However, many subsidies are not within
the scope of these rules.
61
OECD, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT: 2015 FINAL
REPORTS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 5 (2015), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/bepsfrequently-asked-questions.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4CG-7E9K].
62
OECD, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT: DEFINING
EFFECTIVE CONTROLLED FOREIGN COMPANY RULES: ACTION 3: 2015 FINAL REPORT ¶ 51
(2015),
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264241152en.pdf?expires=1607969647&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=4BCF8B61DC243
EC8962B7701AC099AFB [https://perma.cc/YC4L-A7KQ].
63 See id. ¶ 63.
64 See id. ¶ 65.
65
See id. ¶ 66. This calculation typically follows the rules of the parent’s
country or the IFRS.
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Another OECD recommendation is to provide a tax credit for
foreign taxes paid by the CFC where its income is subject to foreign
tax.66
Where these recommendations are followed, MNEs should
generally be better off when their CFCs receive non-tax subsidies
instead of tax benefits. For example, assume that a CFC which
reports taxable income of $2,000 in a jurisdiction with a corporate
income tax rate of twenty percent can choose between the following
alternatives:
(a) Tax benefit that will reduce its tax liability to zero,
thereby saving $400.
(b) Subsidy of $500 that is subject to tax, resulting in a net
benefit of $400.
(c) Subsidy of $400 that is not subject to tax.
Table 3 summarizes the taxable income, tax liability, and
effective tax rate for the three alternatives.
Table 3
(a) Tax benefits

(b) Subsidy
subject to tax

(c) Subsidy not
subject to tax

Taxable income

2,000

2,500

2,00067

Income tax

0

500

400

Effective tax rate

0%

20%

20%

If the CFC receives a subsidy, the effective tax rate will be twenty
percent. If the CFC receives a tax benefit, the tax rate would be zero
percent. A higher effective tax rate is more likely to qualify for a tax
rate exemption under other countries’ CFC rules. In addition, even
if the effective tax rate is below the exemption threshold, a parent
company of a CFC that receives a non-tax subsidy and pays tax on
its taxable income should be able to claim a tax credit for the tax the
CFC paid. A parent company of a CFC that receives a tax benefit
and does not pay any tax cannot claim any credit. Therefore, the
See id. ¶¶ 122-27.
If the subsidy amount is included in the taxable income, then the figure
should be 2,400, and the effective tax rate should be 16.66%. There is no clear
guidance on whether a tax-exempt subsidy should be included in the CFC’s income
for the purpose of applying the CFC rules.
66
67
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application of CFC rules following the OECD recommendations
would favor CFCs that receive non-tax subsidies and disfavor CFCs
that receive equivalent tax benefits.
d. Proposal for a Global Minimum Tax
The OECD is now developing a proposal for a global minimum
tax as part of the OECD’s work on international tax challenges
arising from the digital economy.68 The OECD’s recent proposals
are grouped into two pillars: Pillar One addresses the challenges of
the cross-border digital economy by allocating the taxing rights with
respect to such businesses.69 Pillar Two’s scope is much broader, as
it “focuses on the remaining BEPS issues and seeks to develop rules
that would provide jurisdictions with a right to ‘tax back’ where
other jurisdictions have not exercised their primary taxing rights or
the payment is otherwise subject to low levels of effective
taxation.” 70 The OECD’s proposal under Pillar Two—the GloBE
proposal—is a proposal for a global minimum tax. Although this
proposal has been developed as part of the OECD’s work on
challenges arising from the digital economy, the envisaged global
minimum tax would not be limited only to the digital economy.71
The OECD has noted that “it proposes a systematic solution

68
OECD, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROJECT SHIFTING PROJECT: PUBLIC
CONSULTATION DOCUMENT: ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITALISATION
OF THE ECONOMY (2019), https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/public-consultationdocument-addressing-the-tax-challenges-of-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J8NZ-WQ9K]. For further discussion about the GloBE proposal
and the design considerations, see LUC DE BROE, ROBERT J. DANON & VIKRAM CHAND,
COMMENTS TO PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT: GLOBAL ANTI-BASE EROSION
PROPOSAL
(“GLOBE”)
–
PILLAR
TWO
8-9
(2019),
https://serval.unil.ch/resource/serval:BIB_D8C1987EFA9C.P001/REF
[https://perma.cc/4492-V38Y]; MICHAEL P. DEVEREUX ET AL., THE OECD GLOBAL
ANTI-BASE
EROSION
PROPOSAL
18-19
(2020),
https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2020-02/OECD_GloBE_proposal_
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2F8Y-SFPS]; Lorraine Eden, Taxing Multinationals:
The GloBE Proposal for a Global Minimum Tax, 49 TAX MGMT. INT’L J. 1 (2020); Joachim
Englisch & Johannes Becker, International Effective Minimum Taxation – The GLOBE
Proposal, 11 WORLD TAX J. 483 (2019). For further discussion on the GloBE regime
and potential reactions of affected countries, see Noam Noked, Defense of Primary
Taxing Rights, 40 VA. TAX REV. (forthcoming 2021).
69
OECD, supra note 11, ¶ 11.
70
Id.
71
Id.
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designed to ensure that all internationally operating businesses pay
a minimum level of tax.”72
In October 2020, the OECD published a blueprint for Pillar Two
which lays out the OECD’s detailed proposal for the design of the
GloBE regime. 73 In this publication, the OECD stated that “[t]he
finalisation of Pillar Two also requires political agreement on key
design features of the subject to tax rule and the GloBE rules
including carve-outs, blending, rule order and tax rates where, at
present, diverging views continue to exist.”74 The OECD also noted
that it intends to “swiftly address the remaining issues with a view
to bringing the process to a successful conclusion by mid-2021 and
to resolve technical issues, develop model draft legislation,
guidelines, and international rules and processes as necessary to
enable jurisdictions to implement a consensus based solution.”75
The OECD proposal includes four rules: the income inclusion
rule, the undertaxed payments rule, the switch-over rule, and the
subject to tax rule. 76 The income inclusion rule “would tax the
income of a foreign branch or a controlled entity if that income was
subject to tax at an effective rate that is below a minimum rate.”77
This rule is a form of a global, unified CFC regime which
imposes taxation on CFC income where it is lightly taxed.78 Thus,
the discussion above with respect to the impact of CFC rules on the
preference for non-tax subsidies is relevant here: Taxation under the
income inclusion rule is less likely to be triggered where a subsidiary
or a branch79 receives a non-tax subsidy because the effective tax rate
would be higher. Under the OECD proposal, non-tax government
grants should be considered as income; refundable tax credits that
meet certain conditions should also be treated as income; and
Id. ¶ 55.
OECD, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT: TAX
CHALLENGES ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION – REPORT ON PILLAR TWO BLUEPRINT
(2020)
[hereinafter
BLUEPRINT],
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/abb4c3d1-en.pdf?expires=1607959735
&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=51E3276343C90F0D14BCC591ECA7F40F
[https://perma.cc/WH3T-U3KT].
74
Id. ¶ 6.
75
Id. at 12.
76
OECD, supra note 11, ¶ 50.
77
Id. ¶ 56(1).
78
Id. at 29; BLUEPRINT, supra note 74, ¶ 9 (“The operation of the IIR is, in some
respects, based on traditional controlled foreign company (CFC) rule principles . . .
.”).
79
The discussion of subsidiaries in this Part also includes branches.
72
73
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refundable tax credits that do not meet these conditions as well as
non-refundable tax credits should reduce the covered tax liability.80
Where the effective tax rate is below the global minimum tax
rate, the top-up tax under the income inclusion rule would be the
difference between the tax paid by the subsidiary and the tax that
should be paid under the global minimum tax rate.81 This means the
tax under the income inclusion rule would generally be lower where
a subsidiary receives a non-tax subsidy and pays tax on its income
instead of receiving an equivalent tax benefit and paying no or low
tax. This would also be the case where the undertaxed payments
rule applies because this rule follows the income inclusion rule’s
methodology for the calculation of the subsidiary’s effective tax rate
and top-up tax.82
The subject to tax rule would result in additional taxation up to
the global minimum tax rate where certain covered payments
between connected persons are subject to an adjusted nominal tax
rate below the minimum rate in the payee jurisdiction.83 In general,
covered payments include royalties, franchise fees, interest fees, and

80
BLUEPRINT, supra note 74, at 69. The conditions that refundable tax credits
need to meet in order to be treated as income (i.e., to be classified as a “qualified
refundable tax credit”) are as follows:

[T]he tax credit regime must be designed in a way so that a credit becomes
refundable within 4 years from when it is first provided. Where the tax
credit regime under the laws of a jurisdiction provides for partial
refundability such that only a fixed percentage or portion of the credit is
refundable, in order for the refundable portion of the credit to be treated
as a qualified refundable tax credit, it must become refundable within 4
years from when it is first provided.
Furthermore, if a refundable tax credit regime is determined to give rise
to a material competitive distortion under the review process described
below, a credit granted under such a regime will not be treated as a
‘qualified refundable tax credit’ under the GloBE.
Id.
81
For further details on how the top-up tax is calculated and applied, see
BLUEPRINT, supra note 74, at ¶¶ 410-52.
82
Id. ¶¶ 12-19. Notably, the undertaxed payments rule is a secondary rule
that would only apply where the income inclusion rule does not apply. Id. The
allocation of the top-up tax under the undertaxed payments rule is different than
that of the income inclusion rule. For the design details of this rule, see id. at 12141. The Blueprint refers to the income inclusion rule and the undertaxed payments
rule as the GloBE rules. See id. at 15.
83
Id. ¶¶ 20, 566-667.
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other payments.84 The OECD proposes that preferential tax rates
that apply to a covered payment (e.g., royalties) should reduce the
adjusted nominal tax rate.85 This means that granting tax benefits
would increase the risk of tax under the subject of tax rule. The tax
under this rule would be lower where a subsidiary is subject to a
higher adjusted nominal tax rate on covered payments and receives
a non-tax subsidy, instead of receiving an equivalent tax benefit
(that reduces the adjusted nominal tax rate) and paying no or low
tax on the relevant payment.
An important design question is whether the GloBE regime
would allow for carve-outs for income from substantial activities in
the relevant jurisdictions. The OECD previously noted that carveouts would “undermine the policy intent and effectiveness of the
GloBE proposal.”86 However, “some jurisdictions have stressed the
importance of including substance carve-outs because, in their view,
such carve-outs are necessary to ensure that the focus of Pillar Two
is on remaining BEPS issues.”87 The OECD now proposes adopting
formulaic substance-based carve-outs based on payroll and tangible
assets, providing that a “modest return” on expenditures on payroll
and tangible assets would be excluded. 88 The OECD noted that,
“provided the amount of the carve-out is limited to a modest return
(sometimes referred to as a ‘routine return’) on expenditures for
payroll and tangible assets, then the MNE will not generally be able
to use the carve-out to shelter other low-tax returns in a particular
jurisdiction.” 89 The proposed carve-outs might not fully exclude
income benefitting from non-harmful preferential tax regimes. If
this is the case and the proposed carve-outs are adopted, then the
attractiveness of such preferential tax regimes would decrease
84
See id. ¶¶ 588-616. These other payments include insurance/reinsurance
premiums, guarantee, brokerage or financing fees, rental payments for using
moveable property, and “an amount paid to or retained by the payee that is
consideration for the supply of marketing, procurement, agency or other
intermediary services.” Id. at 156.
85
Id. ¶ 640.
86
OECD, supra note 11, at 29.
87
OECD, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROJECT SHIFTING PROJECT:
STATEMENT BY THE OECD/G20 INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS ON THE TWO-PILLAR
APPROACH TO ADDRESS THE TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM THE DIGITALISATION OF
THE ECONOMY ¶ 12 (2020), https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/statement-by-theoecd-g20-inclusive-framework-on-beps-january-2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UA3G-UX7Z].
88
BLUEPRINT, supra note 74, at 92-100.
89
Id. ¶ 333.
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because the MNEs would still be taxed on the relevant income. This
would increase countries’ motivation to replace such tax incentives
with non-tax subsidies.90
Another important design question concerns “blending”: “the
extent to which an MNE can combine high-tax and low-tax income
from different sources taking into account the relevant taxes on such
income in determining the effective (blended) tax rate on such
income.” 91 If the global minimum tax is implemented based on
worldwide blending,92 granting tax benefits is less likely to trigger a
global minimum tax where the MNE’s blended effective tax rate is
above the minimum rate. Thus, the impact on tax incentives would
be lower. However, if the GloBE rules are implemented on a
country-by-country basis (jurisdictional blending) as proposed by
the OECD, 93 this would make tax incentives less attractive
(assuming that there is no carve-out for the income benefitting from
these tax incentives) because the relevant income could be subject to
a global minimum tax in other jurisdictions.
Other design features of the global minimum tax could influence
the incentives that governments would offer to attract MNE
investment. For example, if the chosen minimum tax rate is 10%,
then governments can offer tax benefits that reduce the MNEs’
effective tax rate down to this rate, and any further incentives could
be granted as non-tax subsidies. To conclude, the OECD’s proposal
has the potential to further increase the tax-driven preference for
non-tax subsidies, especially if adopted without carve-outs for nonharmful tax benefits.
IV. COUNTRIES’ PREFERENCE FOR NON-TAX SUBSIDIES
Countries now have stronger incentives to adopt non-tax
subsidies instead of equivalent tax incentives. As MNEs prefer nontax subsidies to tax benefits for the reasons explained in Part III,
countries can attract more MNE investment at the same economic
For further discussion about the implications of carve-outs, see DEVEREUX
supra note 68, at 18-19; DE BROE, DANON & CHAND, supra note 68, at 9-10.
91
OECD, supra note 5, ¶ 11(b). For analysts’ views on blending, see DEVEREUX
ET AL., supra note 68, at 18; DE BROE, DANON & CHAND, supra note 68, at 8-9.
92
Under the blended approach, the effective tax rate is calculated based on
the MNE’s tax liability and taxable income in all jurisdictions outside that of the
parent company; OECD, supra note 5, at 7.
93
BLUEPRINT, supra note 74, ¶ 285.
90

ET AL.,
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cost by offering non-tax subsidies instead of tax benefits. In
addition, the OECD and the EU scrutinize the preferential tax
regimes offered by countries around the world. Countries run the
risk of being targeted by the OECD or the EU if they find they offer
harmful preferential tax regimes. These risks can be avoided by
offering non-tax subsidies instead of tax benefits.
a. OECD’s Scrutiny Over Harmful Tax Practices
In a 1998 report, the OECD set up a policy to address the
problem of harmful tax practices.94 The report called for the creation
of a Forum on Harmful Tax Practices (“FHTP”) and developed a
framework for assessing whether a preferential tax regime should
be considered as harmful. 95 The assessment of whether a
preferential tax regime is harmful should consider various factors.
The five key factors are as follows:
(i) The regime imposes no or low effective tax rates on
income from geographically mobile financial and other
service activities.
(ii) The regime is ring-fenced from the domestic economy.
(iii) The regime lacks transparency.
(iv) There is no effective exchange of information with
respect to the regime.
(v) The regime fails to require substantial activities.96

94
OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE (1998),
https://www.oecd.org/tax/harmful/1904176.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6T89B6X4].
95 See id. ¶¶ 10, 18.
96
OECD, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT: HARMFUL
TAX PRACTICES – 2018 PROGRESS REPORT ON PREFERENTIAL REGIMES: INCLUSIVE
FRAMEWORK ON BEPS: ACTION 5, ¶ 18 (2019), https://www.oecdilibrary.org/docserver/9789264311480-en.pdf?expires=1607962177&id=id&accna
me=guest&checksum=1CF12193CAA210699ED141838FF9DD68
[https://perma.cc/U6UP-GARL]. In addition to the key factors, there are other
secondary factors: “(i) An artificial definition of the tax base. (ii) Failure to adhere
to international transfer pricing principles. (iii) Foreign source income exempt from
residence country taxation. (iv) Negotiable tax rate or tax base. (v) Existence of
secrecy provisions.” Id. ¶ 19. The factors in the OECD 1998 report were somewhat
different and were updated as part of the BEPS project and the subsequent work of
the OECD.
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Since the 1998 report, the FHTP has been reviewing preferential
regimes to ensure they are not harmful. 97 All countries that are
members of the Inclusive Framework are subject to this review.98 As
of January 2019, the FHTP has reviewed 225 regimes.99 As a result
of this review, many regimes have been abolished or amended to
remove features that put them at risk of being declared harmful.100
Non-tax subsidies are not within the scope of this standard.
Action 5 provides that “[i]n order for a regime to be considered
preferential, it must offer some form of tax preference in comparison
with the general principles of taxation in the relevant country.”101 If
an incentive is granted as a non-tax subsidy and not as a tax benefit,
it is not within the scope of this review.
Where a preferential tax regime is at risk of being considered
harmful, countries may offer an equivalent non-tax subsidy instead.
However, unlike harmful tax benefits that are granted without
requiring commensurate substantial activities in return,
governments generally grant non-tax subsidies to MNEs for
substantial activities they carry out in the relevant countries. For
example, the Israeli government agreed to grant $1 billion to Intel
for investing around $11 billion in manufacturing activities within
the country. 102 It is unlikely the Israeli government would have
agreed to provide this subsidy without Intel’s undertaking of these
activities in Israel. In contrast, governments are more likely to
provide tax benefits to geographically mobile income without
requiring commensurate substantial activities in return. 103 This
means governments are generally less likely to replace harmful tax
See id. at 13.
Id. at 9.
99 Id. at 10.
100 See id. at 17-32.
101
OECD, supra note 58, ¶ 13.
102
Alisa Odenheimer, Intel to Invest an Unprecedented $11 Billion in Israel
Factory,
BLOOMBERG
(Jan.
29,
2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-29/intel-to-invest-11-billio
n-in-israel-finance-minister-says.
103
For example, a patent box that grants an exemption for income from
intellectual property has been developed in other jurisdictions. See generally Fabian
Gaessler, Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, Should There be Lower Taxes on Patent
Income? 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24843, 2019) (indicating
that certain countries have established special tax treatments, known as patent
boxes, for corporate income derived from patents to encourage innovation). Under
Action 5, BEPS-compliant patent boxes must have a substance requirement (the tax
benefit is limited to the income attributed to the relevant jurisdiction based on the
proportionate R&D expenditure in that jurisdiction); OECD, supra note 58, at 24-25.
97
98
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benefits with equivalent non-tax subsidies that do not require
substantial activities.
Nonetheless, there is still some risk that some jurisdictions might
grant subsidies calculated in reference to the MNEs’ tax liability
without requiring commensurate substantial activities in return.
For example, instead of granting a tax benefit of $400, a government
can collect $400 as tax and grant $400 as a non-tax subsidy to offset
the recipient’s tax liability. Where subsidies are designed to offset
the recipients’ tax liability, they could be viewed as tax benefits in
disguise. It should also be noted that a failure to require substance
is only one of the factors in determining whether a regime is
harmful.104 A tax incentive scheme might be classified as harmful if
it is ring-fenced from the domestic economy, it lacks transparency,
or if there is no effective exchange of information with respect to the
regime. Equivalent non-tax subsidies would not be subject to
similar scrutiny. The OECD and some countries may view such
non-tax subsidies as an attempt to circumvent the international
standard on harmful tax competition. However, it is unclear if it is
possible to take any action against non-tax subsidies within the
existing framework.105 In addition, there might be an information
problem—the OECD and other countries may not be able to identify
and detect instances where countries grant non-tax subsidies instead
of equivalent harmful tax benefits. If a non-tax subsidy is not
required to be reported under other laws, the OECD and other
countries might not know that a country is engaged in harmful
subsidy competition. Discretionary and selective non-tax subsidies
might be less transparent and harder to monitor.106
b. EU’s Blacklisting of Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions
In 1997, the EU adopted the Code of Conduct for Business
Taxation with the purpose of curbing harmful tax competition

For the list of factors, see OECD, supra note 96, and accompanying text.
Nonetheless, as noted above, if a subsidy is directly linked to the taxpayer’s
income or tax liability, there is a higher risk that the OECD will treat the subsidy as
a tax benefit.
106
There might be little or no transparency with respect to how the discretion
is exercised.
104
105
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among its Member States.107 The Code of Conduct provides that the
assessment of tax measures to determine whether they are harmful
should include several factors, such as whether the tax benefits are
ring-fenced. 108 Tax benefits are ring-fenced when they are only
available to foreigners or to transactions with foreigners, or the
benefits are otherwise ring-fenced from the domestic market so that
the national tax base is unaffected by these tax benefits.109
In 2016, the EU decided on the criteria and the process that led
to the EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes in
2017.110 The criteria include whether the jurisdictions comply with
the international standards on tax transparency, the BEPS minimum
standards and the EU’s standard of fair taxation. Under the latter
criterion, jurisdictions should not have preferential tax measures
that could be classified as harmful under the Code of Conduct, and
they “should not facilitate offshore structures or arrangements
aimed at attracting profits which do not reflect real economic
activity in the jurisdiction.”111

107
Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council Meeting Concerning Taxation Policy,
1998
O.J.
(C2)
1,
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/resources/documen
ts/coc_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ELE-M3HS].
108
The EU’s list of factors is as follows:

1. whether advantages are accorded only to non-residents or in respect of
transactions carried out with non-residents, or
2. whether advantages are ring-fenced from the domestic market, so they
do not affect the national tax base, or
3. whether advantages are granted even without any real economic
activity and substantial economic presence within the Member State
offering such tax advantages, or
4. whether the rules for profit determination in respect of activities within
a multinational group of companies departs from internationally accepted
principles, notably the rules agreed upon within the OECD, or
5. whether the tax measures lack transparency, including where legal
provisions are relaxed at administrative level in a non-transparent way.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 3.
Council Conclusions on the Criteria for and Process Leading to the
Establishment of the EU List of Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions for Tax Purposes,
2016 O.J. (C 461) 2.
111 Id. § 2.2.
109
110
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In December 2017, the EU published a list of non-cooperative tax
jurisdictions, which included seventeen non-EU jurisdictions. 112
Eight of the seventeen jurisdictions that were blacklisted had
harmful preferential tax regimes as the factor or one of the factors
that resulted in their blacklisting.113 The EU noted that “effective
and proportionate defensive measures, in both non-tax and tax areas
could be applied by the EU and Member States vis-à-vis the noncooperative jurisdictions, as long as they are part of such list . . . .”114
The EU noted that the Member States should increase administrative
measures targeting the relevant jurisdictions or taxpayers benefiting
from the relevant regimes.115 It also noted that Member States can
apply various other defensive measures, such as, inter alia, nondeductibility of certain expenses, withholding tax measures, stricter
CFC rules, special documentation and disclosure requirements.116
The EU’s definition of harmful preferential tax regimes appears
to be broader than the BEPS Action 5 definition, as made apparent
by the blacklisting of South Korea. The EU noted that “Korea has
harmful preferential tax regimes and did not commit to amending
or abolishing them by 31 December 2018.” 117 The blacklisting of
Korea was particularly surprising because Korea is a G20 and OECD
member, it has been committed to the implementation of BEPS,118
and the OECD did not find Korea’s preferential tax regimes to be
harmful.119 However, it appears that the EU holds a stricter position
regarding ring-fenced preferential tax regimes that are only
available to foreign investors.
The Korean government objected to the EU’s determination that
its ring-fenced preferential tax regimes for foreign investment
112
The EU List of Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions for Tax Purposes, at 8-9, 2019 O.J.
(C 438). These jurisdictions are American Samoa, Bahrain, Barbados, Grenada,
Guam, Republic of Korea, Macao SAR, Marshall Islands, Mongolia, Namibia, Palau,
Panama, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and United Arab
Emirates. Id.
113
These eight jurisdictions are Barbados, Republic of Korea, Namibia,
Panama, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Trinidad and Tobago, and Tunisia. See id.
114 Id. at 6.
115 See id. at 13.
116 See id. at 13-14.
117 Id. at 8.
118 See, e.g., Ted Tae-Gyung Kim, Tax Transparency and Disclosure in Korea, 72
BULL. FOR INT’L TAX’N 360 (June 2018). “Korea has actively participated in the
implementation of international standards proposed by the OECD.” Id. at 360.
119 See id. at 363 (noting that no harmful tax regimes were found in Korea in a
recent 2017 review by members of the Inclusive Framework on BEPS); OECD, supra
note 96, ¶ 46.
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(which include its foreign investment zones and free economic
zones, available only to foreign investors) are harmful preferential
tax regimes.120 The Korean government stressed the fact that “the
EU has expanded the OECD’s BEPS standards to include the
manufacturing sector,” which goes beyond the OECD application of
the preferential tax regime standard only to easily mobile activities,
such as finance and services.121 Although Korea protested that the
EU’s decision violates Korea’s tax sovereignty because it imposes
EU standards on non-EU countries,122 Korea decided to yield and
committed to repealing or amending its preferential tax regimes.
Following this commitment, the EU removed Korea from the list in
January 2018. 123 Seven other blacklisted jurisdictions were also
removed from the list at that time after they made similar
commitments.124 Korea repealed the ring-fenced tax incentives for
foreign investors in late 2018.125
The EU criteria for determining whether a jurisdiction is a noncooperative jurisdiction for tax purposes, including the EU
standards on what would be considered harmful preferential tax
regimes, do not cover or address non-tax subsidy regimes. Thus,
countries can avoid blacklisting by offering ring-fenced non-tax
subsidy regimes that would be classified as harmful if they were
granted equivalent tax benefits. Many countries, such as Korea,
already offer a mix of various investment incentives, including cash
120
See Press Release, Ministry of Strategy & Fin. of S. Korea., Government
Position on EU Announcement of the List of 17 Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions (Dec.
6,
2017),
https://english.moef.go.kr/ec/selectTbEconomicDtl.do%3bjsessionid=Y9dRxb3C
FHCcCQWV0+9vYpnW.node10?boardCd=E0003&seq=4403&boardCdKey=N
[https://perma.cc/TNC2-WYMP] (detailing the reasons for the ministry’s rejection
of the EU’s determination).
121 Id.
122 Id.
123
European Union Press Release, Taxation: Eight Jurisdictions Removed
from
EU
List
(Jan.
24,
2018),
https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/canada/38654/taxation-eight-jurisdictions-r
emoved-eu-list_en [https://perma.cc/Y4PC-HUDU].
124
Id. These jurisdictions are Barbados, Grenada, Macao SAR, Mongolia,
Panama, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates.
125
Korea Enacts 2019 Tax Reform Bill, EY GLOBAL (Jan. 2, 2019),
https://www.ey.com/en_gl/tax-alerts/korea-enacts-2019-tax-reform-bill
[https://perma.cc/2ZMN-JEE9].
The current EU list of non-cooperative
jurisdictions for tax purposes includes American Samoa, Cayman Islands, Fiji,
Guam, Oman, Palau, Panama, Samoa, Seychelles, Trinidad and Tobago, US Virgin
Islands, and Vanuatu. Conclusions on the Revised EU List of Non-Cooperative
Jurisdictions for Tax Purposes, 2020 O.J. (C 64) 8.
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grants and other non-tax subsidies,126 which could be expanded as
the ability of these countries to attract foreign investment by offering
tax incentives becomes more limited.
V. POLICY ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED CHANGES
What are the policy implications of this tax-driven preference for
non-tax subsidies?
This Part analyzes the relevant policy
considerations. It also considers how other legal frameworks that
regulate subsidies—the WTO subsidy rules and the EU state aid
rules—apply to tax and non-tax subsidies. Based on this analysis,
this Article contends that the international tax standards should not
create a preference for non-tax subsidies over equivalent tax
benefits. Following this approach, this Part proposes several
changes in the international tax standards.
a. Tax Policy Considerations
The preference for non-tax subsidies over equivalent tax
subsidies might result in distortions and welfare losses. Treating
equivalent non-harmful tax subsidies and non-tax subsidies
differently could result in suboptimal governmental policies. A
recent OECD report on R&D tax and non-tax incentives noted that
“[a]n optimal policy mix will likely require a combination of both
direct and indirect [i.e., tax] support instruments.”127 According to
Weisbach and Nussim, the choice between an equivalent tax
expenditure and a spending program should depend on which
agency would optimally administer the scheme.128 The tax-driven
preference for non-tax subsidies might result in an efficiency cost
126
See, e.g., FDI Procedures & Incentives, INVEST KOREA (2017),
http://www.investkorea.org/en/foreigner/invest.do [https://perma.cc/BYX7ZQZT].
127 See Silvia Appelt, Fernando Galindo-Rueda & Ana Cinta Gonzalez Carbal,
Measuring R&D Tax Support: Findings from the New OECD R&D Tax Incentives
Database 47 (OECD Sci., Tech. & Indus., Working Paper No. 2019/06, 2019),
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/d16e6072-en.pdf?expires=1607966060
&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=B3D0B093CAD27BFD955C7583A84E2AD2
[https://perma.cc/8RQD-VBFZ].
128 See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 15, at 957 (arguing that the decision to
use the tax system to carry out a non-tax program is not a question of tax policy but
rather one of institutional design).
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where the optimal instrument is a tax benefit and the optimal choice
is distorted by the tax-driven preference for non-tax subsidies.
Welfare losses may occur where non-harmful tax benefits that
increase welfare cannot be replaced with equivalent non-tax
subsidies, or where they can be replaced but at a high cost. For
example, assume that a government offers non-harmful investment
tax benefits that increase the national welfare in the relevant
country.129 As discussed in the previous Parts, recent international
tax reforms make these tax incentives less attractive for MNEs.
There should be no welfare loss if the government can replace the
tax benefits with equivalent non-tax subsidies with no additional
cost. However, some governments may not be able to easily replace
tax incentives with equivalent non-tax subsidies. This might be the
result of budgetary rules that impose more restrictions on non-tax
subsidies or political economy considerations. Welfare losses might
occur where welfare-increasing tax benefits become less attractive
and they cannot be replaced with equivalent non-tax subsidies.
On the other hand, where tax incentives decrease the national
welfare,130 there may be a welfare gain if the tax benefits become less
attractive and they are not replaced with equivalent subsidies. This
could lead to the repeal of such inefficient tax incentives or to a
decrease in the uptake of such incentives. As we expect that some
tax incentive programs are efficient and some are not, the impact
should be mixed. However, even if some tax incentive schemes are
suboptimal, it is unclear whether the international tax norms should
disfavor both optimal and suboptimal tax benefits as a way to
reduce the use of the suboptimal ones.
With respect to harmful preferential tax regimes, some countries
might replace such tax benefits with equivalent harmful non-tax
subsidies as discussed in Part IV. As discussed above, it is unlikely
that governments will replace harmful tax incentives that do not
require economic substance with equivalent subsidies. However,
there is some risk that some governments might grant subsidies
designed to offset the recipients’ tax liability without requiring
commensurate substantial activities in return. Countries may also
offer ring-fenced non-tax subsidies that the EU and other countries
might find problematic if equivalent tax benefits were granted.
129
This may be the case where the investment incentives substantially
increase foreign direct investment and employment, resulting in domestic
spillovers.
130
This would be the case if the cost of the incentive regime exceeds the
resulting benefits.
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Another consideration concerns the transparency of equivalent
tax incentives and non-tax subsidies.
The BEPS standards
substantially increase the transparency of tax incentives, as tax
rulings must be exchanged under Action 5, and even in the absence
of a reportable tax ruling, a CbC report would show if an MNE paid
no or low tax in a particular jurisdiction. Equivalent non-tax
subsidies would be less transparent if the disclosure is not required
under other laws. 131 In most cases, where a non-tax subsidy is
granted for substantial activities in the relevant jurisdiction, other
jurisdictions are unlikely to be harmed by the lack of transparency.
However, if some countries adopt subsidies designed to offset the
recipients’ tax liability (which effectively makes them tax subsidies
in disguise), then the lack of transparency becomes problematic.
From an EU standpoint, the lack of transparency concerning ringfenced subsidies might be problematic. To address these issues, it is
possible to require the disclosure of potentially harmful non-tax
subsidies where the disclosure of equivalent tax benefits is required.
Additionally, different tax treatment for equivalent tax benefits
and non-tax subsidies might be inconsistent with the principle of tax
fairness (i.e., horizontal equity), which is the notion that the tax
system should treat similarly situated taxpayers similarly. 132 As
shown in this Article, an MNE that receives a non-tax subsidy would
have an advantage over an MNE that receives an equivalent tax
benefit. As these measures are equivalent, these two MNEs are
similarly situated and should be treated similarly under the tax
system. Therefore, following the principle of tax fairness would
require treating MNEs that receive equivalent tax and non-tax
incentives similarly.
Therefore, this Article argues that the international tax standards
should not create a preference for non-tax subsidies over equivalent
tax benefits. A framework that treats equivalent tax and non-tax
subsidies similarly would be more efficient for the reasons discussed
above. Also, it would be consistent with the principle of horizontal
equity and would improve transparency.
This approach is similar to the approach adopted in the WTO
subsidy rules and the EU state aid rules, as these legal frameworks
131
Disclosure of certain subsidies may be required under domestic law, the
WTO subsidy rules, and the EU state aid rules. See sources cited supra note 60
(describing Commission regulations and WTO rules governing disclosure of certain
subsidies). However, many subsidies might not fall within the scope of these rules.
132 See, e.g., Brian Galle, Tax Fairness, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1323, 1324-25
(2008), and the literature reviewed there on horizontal equity.
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generally treat equivalent tax and non-tax subsidies similarly.
Under the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, a subsidy exists where a benefit is conferred through a
financial contribution by a government or a public body, or through
any form of income or price support.133 Financial contribution is
defined broadly, and it includes “government revenue that is
otherwise due [that] is foregone or not collected [e.g. fiscal
incentives such as tax credits].”134 Hence, the WTO rules generally
apply to subsidies irrespective of whether they are provided as tax
benefits, grants, or other forms of financial contribution. The EU
rules on state aid apply to aid measures “in any form
whatsoever,”135 including tax measures.136 In general, a tax measure
is considered an “aid” if it reduces the firm’s tax burden, it is granted
through state resources (including as a loss of tax revenue), it affects
competition and trade between the EU Member States, and it is
specific or selective.137 Under these rules, subsidies and equivalent
WTO Subsidies Agreement, supra note 17, art. 1.1.
See id. (footnote omitted). Under art. 1.1(a)(1), “financial contribution”
exists where:
133
134

(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants,
loans, and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities
(e.g. loan guarantees);
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected
(e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax credits);
(iii) a government provides goods or services other than general
infrastructure, or purchases goods;
(iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts
or directs a private body to carry out one or more of the type of functions
illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which would normally be vested in the
government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices
normally followed by governments.
Id.
135
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 107(1), Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 91.
136
Commission Notice on the Application of the State Aid Rules to Measures
Relating to Direct Business Taxation, 1998 O.J. (C 384) ¶ 8,
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/compilation/g_15_01_1
4_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/6M4J-QXHX] (“In applying the Community rules on
State aid, it is irrelevant whether the measure is a tax measure, since Article 92 [now
107] applies to aid measures ‘in any form whatsoever.’”). For further discussion,
see Sandra Marco Colino, The Long Arm of State Aid Law: Crushing Corporate Tax
Avoidance, 44 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2020).
137 See Commission Notice on the Application of the State Aid Rules to Measures
Relating to Direct Business Taxation, supra note 137, ¶ 16. To be considered as aid,
the measure should be “an exception to the application of the tax system.” Id.
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tax measures should generally be subject to similar treatment. Thus,
the WTO rules on subsidies and the EU rules on state aid generally
treat tax incentives and other subsidies similarly.
b. Proposed Changes in the International Tax Standards
The discussion below sets forth several proposals for changes in
the international tax standards to achieve similar treatment of
equivalent tax benefits and non-tax subsidies. If policymakers
accept the principle that equivalent tax incentives and non-tax
subsidies should be treated similarly, the implementation details of
these proposals could be further developed.
i.

CbC Reports

As discussed in Section III.a, non-harmful tax incentives
negatively affect the CbC report because the tax liability and the
effective tax rate are lower in comparison to a CbC report of an MNE
that receives a non-tax subsidy and pays tax on the income in the
relevant jurisdiction. This could be addressed by disclosing in an
additional column in the CbC report the estimated income tax that
would apply if a non-harmful tax benefit were granted as an
equivalent non-tax subsidy. For example, assume that the tax
incentive schemes in a particular country were found to be nonharmful. If these tax incentives were replaced with equivalent nontax subsidies, then the tax liability in that country would have been
higher as demonstrated in Section III.a. The proposed additional
column would report that simulated tax liability. To implement this
proposal, there should be guidance on how to quantify the tax
subsidy and calculate the simulated tax liability.138 This additional
information can assist tax authorities when they review CbC reports
to conduct risk assessment to identify suspected instances of
artificial profit shifting. Providing this additional information could
reduce the risk that MNEs would be suspected of profit shifting
138
Among other matters, the guidance should address the following issues:
what tax rate should be used to quantify the tax subsidy and calculate the simulated
tax liability on an equivalent subsidy (the jurisdiction’s statutory tax rate, the
MNE’s effective tax rate or the marginal tax rate) and whether it should be assumed
that the equivalent non-tax subsidy is subject to tax in the relevant jurisdiction.
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where the low tax liability is a result of receiving non-harmful tax
benefits.
While tax incentives are reflected in the CbC report, equivalent
non-tax subsidies (including potentially harmful subsidies) are not
reflected in the CbC report. This could be addressed by requiring
the disclosure of subsidies, defined broadly, 139 in an additional
column in the CbC report. This information would allow countries
to inquire whether the subsidies offered by other countries are
equivalent to harmful tax measures. This would also enable
countries and international bodies, such as the OECD, to assess the
magnitude of the international subsidy competition. It is possible to
adopt a narrower disclosure requirement that would only apply to
subsidies that have certain features which raise the suspicion they
might be harmful (e.g., subsidies calculated in reference to the
recipients’ tax position).
ii.

Spontaneous Exchange of Tax Rulings and Scrutiny over
Harmful Tax Practices

As noted in Section III.b., under the rules on the spontaneous
exchange of tax rulings, governments are not subject to a similar
reporting requirement when they offer subsidy rulings that have the
same economic effect as reportable tax rulings. Although countries
are less likely to grant non-tax subsidies without requiring
commensurate substantial activities in return, there is some risk that
some countries might offer subsidies designed to offset the
recipients’ tax liability. Such subsidies could be viewed as tax
benefits in disguise. This risk can be addressed by requiring the
spontaneous exchange of information about subsidies calculated
based on the recipients’ tax position. This would require expanding
the “ruling” definition. 140 Similarly, the OECD’s and the EU’s
scrutiny over harmful tax practices could also include subsidies
connected to recipients’ tax position or designed to offset the
recipients’ tax liability.

139
The subsidy definition for this purpose can follow the WTO’s subsidy
definition, as discussed in the text accompanying supra note 134.
140
As discussed above, the current definition of “ruling” is “any advice
provided by a tax authority to a specific taxpayer or group of taxpayers concerning
their tax situation and on which they are entitled to rely.” See OECD, supra note 58
and accompanying text.
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iii. Recommended CFC Rules and the GloBE Proposal
As discussed in Section III.c., the OECD recommendations for
CFC rules favor CFCs which receive non-tax subsidies and disfavor
CFCs that receive equivalent tax benefits. A CFC that receives a nontax subsidy and pays tax is more likely to qualify for a tax rate
exemption. Even if the effective tax rate is below the exemption
threshold, a parent of a CFC that receives a non-tax subsidy and
pays tax on its income would be able to claim a credit for the tax the
CFC paid. A parent of a CFC cannot claim any credit if the CFC
receives a tax benefit and does not pay tax.
A similar treatment for non-harmful tax benefits and equivalent
subsidies can be accomplished by providing carve-outs for nonharmful tax incentive schemes so that CFC income would not
include income that benefited from these tax incentives.
Alternatively, similar to the proposal above concerning the CbC
reporting, it is possible to take into account, in the application of the
CFC rules, the simulated income tax that would apply if the tax
benefits were structured as a non-tax subsidy. The simulated
effective tax rate can be used as the CFC’s effective tax rate for the
purposes of the CFC rules. In addition, the parent of the CFC should
be able to use a tax credit based on the CFC’s simulated tax liability.
Similar issues arise in the context of the OECD’s recent GloBE
proposal, discussed in Section III.d. If the GloBE rules are adopted
without carve-outs for income benefitting from non-harmful tax
incentives, this would further reduce the benefit from such tax
incentives and increase the preference for non-tax subsidies. In
order to treat equivalent non-harmful tax and non-tax subsidies
similarly, the GloBE rules could include carve-outs for non-harmful
tax incentive schemes. Similarly, when calculating the adjusted
nominal tax rate when applying the subject to tax rule, this rate
should not be reduced because of non-harmful preferential tax
incentives.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The international community has been dealing with the
challenges of harmful tax competition for decades. As the efforts to
curb certain forms of tax competition have intensified in recent
years, it is important to consider the potential impacts of recent
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international tax reforms on other forms of competition among
countries.
This Article makes two contributions to the literature on tax
policy and international economic law. First, it shows how recent
international tax reforms encourage the adoption of non-tax
subsidies over equivalent tax incentives. Second, the Article
analyzes the policy considerations and implications of the taxdriven preference for non-tax subsidies. Based on this analysis, the
Article recommends that the international tax standards be
amended so they would treat equivalent tax and non-tax incentives
similarly. The Article also outlines several changes in the
international tax standards that could advance this goal.
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